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NOTE
A WHOLE LOT OF NOTHING GOING ON: THE
CIVIL RIGHTS "REMEDY" OF THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT
Christopher James Regan*
Forma Pauperis-In the character of a poor person-a method by which a
litigant without money for lawyers is considerptely permitted to lose [her]
case.
-Ambrose Bierce'
INTRODUCrION
When a law is referenced in more journal articles than court
cases, both the writers and the lawmakers have made a mistake. One
such mistake is the vaunted civil rights remedy provision of the 1994
Violence Against Women Act.2 The civil rights remedy (CRR) was in-
tended to be a federal response to the problem of violence against
American women.3 Unfortunately, the civil rights remedy has proven
to be a federal response to the problem ofjournal topic selection for
American law students.4
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2000. Thanks to my parents,
Richard and Suzanne. Thanks also to those who read drafts of this Note and
corrected errors of style, fact, and tone, only to see the author leave them in anyway
Professors Alan Gunn and Patrick Schiltz, Michael Davi, Melonie Jurgens, Jonathan
Bridges, Paige Capacci, Robinne DeMayo, Brendan Gardiner, Rachel Sklar, and Lisa
Pisciotta.
1 AMBROSE BmRcE, TmE DEvH's DianoNAnR 38 (Stanley Applebaum ed., Dover
Publications 1993) (1911).
2 Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (1994).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1998).
4 See, e.g., KristinJ. Bouchard, Note, Can Civil Damage Suits Stop Stalkers, 6 B.U.
PUB. INr. LJ. 551 (1997); Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights for Battered Women: Axiomatic
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& Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ.J. 1 (1992); Birgit Schmidt Am Busch, Note, Domestic Vio-
lence And Title III of the Violence Against Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6 HAs-
TINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1995); Corinne Casarino, Note, Civil Remedies in Acquaintance
Rape Cases, 6 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 185 (1996); Lisa A. Carroll, Comment, Women's Power-
less Tool: How Congress Overreached the Constitution with the Civil Rights Remedy of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, 30J. MARsHALL L. REV. 803 (1997); Mary C. Carty, Comment,
Doe v. Doe and the Violence Against Women Act: A Post-Lopez Commerce Clause Analysis,
71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 465 (1997); Christine Conover, The Violence Against Women Act:
Stabilizing Commerce Through a Civil Rights Remedy, 1 J. GENDER RACE &Jusr. 269 (1997);
Jennifer Lynn Crawford, Note, America's Dark Little Secret: Challenging the Constitutional-
ity of the Civil Rights Provision of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, 47 CATH. U. L. REV.
189 (1997); David Fine, Note, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: The Proper Federal
Role in Policing Domestic Violence, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 252 (1998); David Frazee, Note,
An Imperfect Remedy for Imperfect Violence: The Construction of Civil Rights in the Violence
Against Women Act, 1 MICH.J. GENDER & L. 163 (1993);Jennifer Gaffney, Note, Amend-
ing the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in
Rape Cases, 6J.L. & POL'Y 247 (1997); W.H. Hallock, Note, The Violence Against Women
Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577 (1993); Rebecca E. Hatch,
Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Surviving the Substantial Effects of United States v.
Lopez, 31 SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 423 (1997); Marcellene E. Hearn, Comment, A Thir-
teenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1097
(1998); Danielle Houck, Note, VAWA After Lopez: Reconsidering Congressional Power
Under the Fourteenth Amendment in Light of Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State
University, 31 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 625 (1998); Derek A. Kurtz, Comment, Does the Vio-
lence Against Women Act Do Violence to the Limits of Congressional Power?, 34 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1047 (1997); Lisanne N. Leasure, Commerce Clause Challenges Spawned by United
States v. Lopez Are Doing Violence to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA): A Survey of
Cases and the Ongoing Debate over How the VAWA WillFare in the Wake of Lopez, 50 ME. L.
REV. 410 (1998); Judi L. Lemos, Comment, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994:
Connecting Gender-Motivated Violence to Interstate Commerce, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1251
(1998); Sarah E. Lesch, Note, A Troubled Inheritance: An Examination of Title III of the
Violence Against Women Act in Light of Current Critiques of Civil Rights Law, 3 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 535 (1993); Peter S. Liuzzo, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
and State University: The Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act-Recognizing
that Violence Targeted at Women Affects Interstate Commerce, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 367 (1997);
Kerrie E. Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil
Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1876
(1996); Stacey L. McKinley, Note, The Violence Against Women Act After United States v.
Lopez: Will Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Be Returned to the States?, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
345 (1996); Kelli C. McTaggart, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Recognizing a
Federal Civil Right to Be Free from Violence, 86 GEo. L.J. 1123 (1998); Charis Mincavige,
Comment, Title III of The Violence Against Women Act: Can It Survive a Commerce Clause
Challenge in the Wake of United States v. Lopez?, 102 Dick. L. Rev. 441 (1998);Jennifer
L. Philpot, Note, Violence Against Women and the Commerce Clause: Can This Marriage
Survive?, 85 K'. L.J. 767 (1997); Chris A. Rauscl, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia Poly-
technic and State University: Violence Against Women, Commerce and the Fourteenth
Amendment-Defining Constitutional Limits, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1601 (1997); Melinda
Renshaw, Comment, Choosing Between Principles of Federal Power: The Civil Rights Remedy
of the Violence Against Women Act, 47 EMORY L.J. 819 (1998); Lori L. Schick, Comment,
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The civil rights remedy allows women who have been physically
abused because of their gender to sue their attackers for damages in
federal court.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, sitting en banc last spring, produced over 80,000 words in
four opinions discussing the constitutionality of this statute-even
though it has produced fewer than ten reported decisions a year since
it became effective in 1995.6 In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Breaking the "Rule of Thumb" and Opening the Curtains-Can the Violence Against Women
Act Survive Constitutional Scrutiny?, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 887 (1997);Johanna R. Shargel,
Note, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106 YAL-E L.J.
1849 (1997); Karen Tichenor, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Continued Confu-
sion Over the Scape of the Commerce Clause, 18 WOMEN's Rrs. L. RE. 329 (1997); Megan
Weinstein, The Violence Against Women Act After United States v. Lopez: Defending the Act
from Constitutional Challenge, 12 BERK.=v WOmN's L.J. 119 (1997); Melanie L. Win-
skie, Note, Can Federalism Save the Violence Against Women Act?, 31 GA. L. REV. 985
(1997). This list reflects student work; there are several more pieces on the subject by
admitted attorneys, United States Senators, and law professors.
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1998).
6 See McCann v. Rosquist, 185 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 1999); Gross v. Weber, No.
98-2394, 1999 WL 604440 (8th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999); Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th
Cir. 1998); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th
Cir. 1997); Santiago v. Alonso, No. 97-2737, 1999 WL 688137 (D. Puerto Rico Aug. 27,
1999); LeBlanc v. Lee, No. CIV-A.97-1811, 1999 WL 670976 (E.D. La. Aug 24, 1999);
Williams v. Board of County Comm'rs, No. 98-2485-JTM, 1999 WL 690101 (D. Kan.
Aug. 24, 1999); Peddle v. Sawyer, No. 398CV2364, 1999 WL 613312 (D. Conn.Jul. 22,
1999); Dill v. Oslick, No. CIV-A.97-6753, 1999 WL 508675 (E.D. Pa.Jul. 19, 1999); Doe
v. Old Rochester Reg'l School Dist., No. 99-10214MEL, 1999 WL 497402 (D. Mass.Jul.
6, 1999); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999); Ericson v. Syra-
cuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Grimm v. Shroyer, 35 F. Supp. 2d 966
(E.D. Ky. 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999); Harris v. Zappan, No.
CIVA97-4957, 1999 WL 391490 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1999); Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp.
2d 64 (D. Mass. 1999); Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Ala. 1998);
Truong v. Smith, 28 F. Supp. 2d 626 (D. Colo. 1998); Dolin ex. rel. N.D. v. West, 22 F.
Supp. 2d 1343 (M.D. Fla. 1998); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98 C 2395, 1998 WL 673629 (N.D.
I11. Sept. 16, 1998); Wilson v. Diocese of N.Y. of Episcopal Church, No. 96
CIV.2400(JGK), 1998 WL 82921 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 26, 1998); Palazzolo v. Ruggiano, 993
F. Supp. 45 (D.R.I. 1998); McCann v. Rosquist, 998 F. Supp. 1246 (D. Utah 1998);
Comardelle v. Hernandez, 26 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. La. 1998); Mattison v. Click Corp.
of Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL 32597 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 27, 1998); Bridges
v. City of Dallas, No. Civ. 3:98-CV-0090-H, 1998 WL 320286 (N.D. Tex.Jun. 8, 1998);
Thorpe v. Virginia State Univ., 6 F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. Va. 1998); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28
F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Newton v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 958 F.
Supp. 248 (W.D.N.C. 1997); Crisonino v. NewYork City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Wesley v.
Don Stein Buick, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Kan. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F.
Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Finley v. Higbee Co., 1 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Ohio 1997);
Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996); Doe v. Abbott Lab., 892 F. Supp. 811
(E.D. La. 1995); Burns v. Landers, No. CV 9661671S, 1997 WL 759828 (Conn. Super.
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and State University,7 the Fourth Circuit struck down the CRR, declar-
ing that it was outside the powers granted to Congress in Article I of
the Constitution.8 The four separate opinions in the case consume
over 100 pages of the Federal Reporter.9
Brzonkala addressed the constitutionality of the CRR,10 but this
Note intends to go beyond the fight over constitutionality and to look
at what the parties are fighting for-the CRR itself. While a great deal
of ink has been spilled analyzing whether Congress has the power to
make this law, few have addressed whether the law can make a differ-
ence for abused women.
In this Note, I conclude that the CRR has failed to ameliorate the
problems faced by abused women. Moreover, the law was a failure
long before its constitutional problems were identified. Put simply,
the law was enacted without a reasonable plan for its enforcement. In
Part I, I explain how Congress created a cause of action without viable
plaintiffs or defendants and then directed the (strictly theoretical)
plaintiffs to courts that could not hear them.
In Part II, this Note examines how the CRR hurts women. The
law not only fails to help, but actually harms women by distracting the
nation's attention from the problem and focusing on the fool's gold
of a civil rights action for domestic violence.
In Part III, I look at some of the more productive directions law
and commentary have taken on this subject-not necessarily advanc-
ing these ideas as solutions, but as proof that the energy devoted to
the CRR could have been far better spent.
I. THE FAILURE OF THE CrvIL RIGHTS REMEDY TO MAKE
A DIFFERENCE
In 1993, Congress found that four million women were battered
every year." In the five years the law has been in force, fewer than
forty reported decisions refer to a suit under the CRR's provisions.12
That contrast is the CRR's legacy.' 3 Proceeding in federal court is a
Ct. Nov. 21, 1997); Balas v. Ruzzo, 703 So.2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Reich v.
Reich, 657 N.Y.S.2d 671 (App. Div. 1997). This list is as inclusive as possible, citing
each published decision that asserts that a CRR claim was filed.
7 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
8 See id. at 826.
9 See id. at 820-933.
10 See id. at 826.
11 See supra note 4, at 810.
12 See supra note 6.
13 Of course, the number of published decisions under the CRR is not a particu-
larly precise indicator of the number of cases filed or pending. Statistics on cases filed
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costly process. The CRR assumes ample resources on the part of
either the plaintiff or the defendant to support the cost of litigating.
These resources do not exist. The CRR further assumes ample judi-
cial resources in the form of federal judges to hear CRR claims.
Those resources do not exist either. The CRR does indeed create a
right, but it falls well short of a remedy.
A. The Problem and the Purported Solution
Violence against women in this country is an epidemic. The four
million women abused in their homes each year14 are just the begin-
ning of a apalling string of statistics. Domestic violence accounts for
more injuries to women than automobile accidents, rapes, and mug-
gings combined.1 5 In 1990, there were more battered women than
married women. 16 A woman is beaten by her partner every fifteen
seconds.' 7 A woman is raped every six minutes.' 8 One in five women
will be raped in her lifetime, and one in six women will be a victim of
domestic violence before she dies.19 Almost one-third of women
killed are murdered by their husbands.20 Because of sampling diffi-
under individual federal statutes are only available for the most commonly used stat-
utes and the CRR is not one of them. However, the number of published decisions
under the CRR can be compared with the number of published decisions under civil
rights statutes for which detailed statistics are kept. For example, since the CRR was
enacted, there have been some 6600 published decisions under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e
(1994) (employment discrimination). Over the same time period, approximately
90,000 cases have been commenced. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts
1998, at tbl. C-2A (visited November 10, 1999) <http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/
c2asep98.pdf> (copy on file with the Notre Dame Law Review). This suggests that pub-
lished decisions undercount cases filed by a factor of about 13. In that case, the 40
reported decisions under the CRR would indicate roughly 520 actual filings. Of
course, since CRR claims are novel, under federal jurisdiction and since they have
thus far often involved constitutional questions, one might expect a greater propor-
tion of CRR decisions to be reported than under more firmly established statutes.
14 See Carroll, supra note 4, at 810.
15 See William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise in Cooper-
ative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources, 48 RUTGES L. REv. 1139,
1141 (1996).
16 See Carroll, supra note 4, at 810.
17 See Maloney, supra note 4, at 1878-79.
18 See id. at 1878-79; see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.,
169 F.3d 820, 913-14 (4th Cir. 1999) (Motz, J., dissenting).
19 See Maloney, supra note 4, at 1879; see also Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 913-14. The
author could uncover no accounting for the unexpected statistic that a woman is
more likely to be raped than to be a victim of domestic violence.
20 See Martha F. Davis & SusanJ. Kraham, Protecting Women's Welfare in the Face of
V/olence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141, 1144-45 (1995).
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culties, it has been suggested that all these numbers underestimate
the rate at which women are victimized by their partners. 21
The CRR declares that all people have a "right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender."22 It creates a federal civil
rights cause of action for women who are beaten because of their
sex 23 and allows an abused woman to sue her abuser in federal or
state court,24 as long as she alleges gender-motivated violence. 25 The
law permits her to seek both compensatory and punitive damages, as
well as equitable relief.26 Another federal law allows women to re-
cover attorney's fees if they are successful in a CRR action. 27 Further-
more, if a woman recovers under the CRR, a pending bill would allow
her to exclude the recovery from her gross income. 28
B. Why the CRR Cannot Help
It would seem that the CRR is a powerful weapon for abused wo-
men, but it just seems that way. Inability to pay an attorney, delay in
obtaining a judgment (likely to be several years, if the suit is success-
ful), and the unlikelihood of enforcing the judgment have been
enough to deter nearly all abused women from availing themselves of
the CRR's provisions.29 The numbers cannot lie-after five years,
there have been at most perhaps a few hundred filings.30 Moreover,
even if all of these difficulties could be made to disappear, and even if
all four million abused women could sue without further delay in fed-
eral courts, nothing more would be accomplished than a shut-down of
those courts. The impossibility of having 646 districtjudges31 hearing
21 See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HoFsTRA L. REv. 801, 809 (1993).
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1998).
23 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 827.
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e) (3) (1998).
25 See id. § 13981(c) (1998).
26 See id.
27 See id. § 1988(b) (1998).
28 See H.R. 1997, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). This raises the question (not dealt with
here) of whether the average abused woman is likely to have a tax attorney.
29 Domestic violence is also typified by victims who do not want to prosecute their
abusers, but it would be a mistake to see that phenomenon as isolated from the practi-
cal obstacles to doing so. See Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive
Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN's LJ. 173, 177 (1997).
30 See supra note 13.
31 Congress has provided for 646 federal district courtjudges. See 28 U.S.C. § 133
(1998).
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4,000,000 additional cases each year (over 6000 per judge) is just ig-
nored by the CRR.32
1. There Are No Plaintiffs-And No Defendants Either
There are no CRR plaintiffs. Considering how powerful the CRR
provisions are-choice of forum, punitive damages, attorney's
fees33-this is telling. Plaintiffs' attorneys would certainly be eager to
take CRR cases if there were plaintiffs to bring them and defendants
from whom to recover. But there are virtually no such lawsuits be-
cause there are hardly any such people. Violence against women pre-
dominates among poor women and women of average means.34
These women have little cash and may not even have a checking ac-
count, a charge account, or a car.35 Their batterers are not deep-
pocketed corporations, government agencies or people who happen
to be insured against damage awards for their intentional torts. They
are four million American boyfriends and husbands who are ex-
32 One might object that statutes are not drafted with the intention of having
every potential plaintiff sue. This is certainly true of statutes where one plaintiff's suit
can create a remedy benefiting a large number of plaintiffs, like an antitrust statute.
Where causes of action are created against institutional defendants (like employment
discrimination statutes), all the potential plaintiffs don't have to sue because a small
number of suits can create a large deterrent effect on employers. On the other hand,
a cause of action for what is essentially an intentional tort, like the CRR, is only effec-
tive to the extent that it is used. CRR suits against one abusive man do not affect
other abusive men and are therefore unlikely to have any deterrent effect, unless such
suits become very common.
33 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
34 See Davis & Kraham, supra note 20, at 1150-51 (1995).
Many domestic violence victims are economically dependent on the men
who abuse them [and) few victims have the resources necessary to begin a
new life for themselves and their children. Batterers commonly isolate bat-
tered women from financial resources. For example, many battered women
do not have ready access to cash, checking accounts, or charge accounts.
One study showed that 27% of battered women had no access to cash, 34%
had no access to a checking account, 51% had no access to charge accounts,
and 22% had no access to a car. This economic isolation may itself increase
the violence.
Id.; see also Pamela Blass Bracher, Comment, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: The
City of Cincinnati's Simple Solution to a Complex Problem, 65 U. GrN. L. REv. 155, 158
(1996) ("Research shows that there are inverse relationships between income and
domestic violence and between education and domestic violence.") (citing ROGER
LANGLEY AND RIcHARD C. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SImENT CRisis 45 (1977)).
35 Id
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tremely unlikely to have the cash on hand to support a civil-rights
trial.36
Thus, the battered woman does not have enough money to pay
an attorney if she loses.3 7 The man cannot pay a judgment if she
wins,38 so a contingent fee arrangement is unlikely.3 9 The man's
homeowners policy does not cover him for intentional torts. Public
interest groups can support only a few test cases, like Brzonkala.40 This
is all to say nothing of poor women, married to poor men, who are
even farther from the courthouse.
In the end, the only people the CRR satisfies are people who
hope for legislation seeming to favor women regardless of its contents.
Perhaps not coincidentally, those are the people who are fighting for
it. In Brzonkala, almost two dozen women's advocacy groups filed ami-
cus curiae briefs on behalf of Christy Brzonkala, arguing that the CRR
36 The notion that a civil rights plaintiff cannot be expected to pay her own way
through a lawsuit is not, to be sure, new. For example, in a discussion of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Professor Robert Kaczorowski writes,
A second obstacle to effective civil rights enforcement was the cost involved
in enforcing civil rights through civil litigation in the federal courts. This
cost would have rendered federal civil remedies a virtual nullity for those
impoverished freedmen who needed them the most. The framers [of the
1866 Act] believed that penal remedies were more effective than civil reme-
dies because the government would bear the cost of this protection, and
because the deterrent effect of criminal penalties was greater than that of
civil damages. The framers expressed these views in rejecting an amendment
to the Civil Rights Bill that would have substituted civil remedies for the
penal sanctions of section two.
RobertJ. Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: A Legisla-
tive Histoy in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565, 583 (1989).
37 See Stephen Pincus & David Rosen, Fighting Back: Filing Suit Under the Violence
Against Women Act, 33 TRIAL 20, 20 (1997); see also Carroll supra note 4, at 1167-68.
38 See Pincus & Rosen, supra note 37, at 20; see also Bassler, supra note 15, at
1167-68.
39 See Bassler, supra note 15, at 1167-68.
40 Christy Brzonkala had a dazzling array of legal talent arrayed behind her as
amici in the politically important Fourth Circuit battle. She received support from,
among others, Virginians Aligned Against Sexual Assault, the Anti-Defamation
League, Center for Women Policy Studies, the DC Rape Crisis Center, Equal Rights
Advocates, the Georgetown University Law Center Sex Discrimination Clinic, Jewish
Women International, the National Alliance of Sexual Assault Coalitions, the National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault,
the National Network to End Domestic Violence, National Organization For Women,
Northwest Women's Law Center; the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Vio-
lence, Inc., Virginia National Organization for Women, Virginia Now Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Incorporated, Women Employed, Women's Law Project, Wo-
men's Legal Defense Fund, Independent Women's Forum, and the Women's Free-
dom Network. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 820.
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was constitutional. 41 Of course, Christy Brzonkala had two things go-
ing for her that most abused women never will-an institution like
Virginia Tech to collect from if she won, and test case status to bring
numerous women's advocacy groups to her side.4 2 Ordinary women's
cases have no such prospects for financial recovery or for private
funding.
As the CRR's supporters surely know, there has always been a
cause of action for people who are violently attacked by others.43
There is no complaint under the CRR that would survive summary
judgment that would not also state a case for battery. Of course, a
battered woman is unlikely to sue her husband for battery for the
same reasons she is unlikely to employ the CRR. She just can't afford
to. And we have known why for more than one hundred years. As
Congressman James Wilson explained on the House floor during the
debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, civil causes of action for civil
rights violations require a plaintiff to
press [her] own way through the courts and pay the bills attendant
thereon. This may do for the rich, but to the poor, who need pro-
tection, it is a mockery .... The citizen can only receive [civil dam-
ages] in the form of a few dollars... if [she] shall be so fortunate as
to recover against a solvent wrongdoer.44
2. There Are Not Enough Federal Courts
Even more disheartening than the CRR's failure to attract plain-
tiffs who can sue is the failure of its proponents to realize that, even if
the intended plaintiffs could sue, the federal courts are not prepared
to hear very many of their claims. An important motivating factor be-
hind the enactment of the CRR was that state courts were not adjudi-
cating the claims of abused women fairly.4 5 But it is only in state
courts that women can be heard in great numbers.4 6
41 See id. at 820-21.
42 One court made it clear that only a few cases will see that kind of support for
plaintiff. Se-Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Conn 1996) ("[B]ecause the Act's
constitutionality has not been previously considered, a group of non-profit organiza-
tions representing and advocating on behalf of women who have survived gender-
motivated violence was granted leave to appear as amicus curiae.").
43 See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955) (discussing the tort of
battery).
44 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (recording the statement of
Congressman James Wilson).
45 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
46 Many of the reasons women do not bring CRR claims are equally applicable to
state law claims like battery; however, state courts are developing responses to domes-
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The impact of a cause of action like the CRR47 has to be mea-
sured by the number of people who receive relief under its provi-
sions-unlike an antitrust plaintiff, a CRR claimant cannot sue on
behalf of those similarly situated. The idea of 6000 more civil filings
for each federal judge is, of course, ridiculous, but even if only one in
ten abused women filed a CRR claim, that would be 600 additional
civil cases perjudge. In 1997, there was a total of 272,027 civil filings
in the United States District Courts. 48 That works out to about 421
filings per judge. If ten percent of abused women filed, their cases
would be sixty percent of the federal civil docket. That will never
come to pass. If only two and a half percent of the four million wo-
men abused each year filed, there would still be a back breaking 151
additional cases for every judge-an increase of about thirty-five per-
cent. And all of this comes at a time when the FederalJudicial Center
has concluded that the size of the federal docket is an "impending
crisis." 4
9
One of the CRR's premises was that state courts and state law
remedies could not stem the tide of violence against women and that
a national solution was required.50 The House and Senate both re-
corded findings to the effect that state systems could not be trusted to
do the job.51 Support for this proposition came in two varieties. The
tic violence that do not require the initiative of the victim. See infra Part III. It is in
providing these kinds of remedies that states enjoy a decisive advantage over the fed-
eral government.
47 See supra note 13.
48 See Judicial Business of the United States Courts 1997, at tbl. S-7 (visited June 28,
1999) <http://ww.uscourts.gov/judicial-business/sO7sep97.pdf.> (copy on file with
the Notre Dame Law Review).
49 FED. CTs. STUDY COMM'N, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE STATES 1-2 (1990). One study determined (ob-
viously incorrectly) that the CRR would create "58,800 suits, with 13,450 reaching the
federal courts at a cost of $43.6 million and 450 staff years." See Charles Gardner
Geyh, Overcoming the Competence/Credibility Paradox in Judicial Impact Assessment: The
Need for an Independent Office of Interbranch Relations, in CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE
EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURTS: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
79, 90 (A. Fletcher Mangum ed., Fed. Jud. Center 1995) (visited Sept. 27, 1999)
<http://www.oc.gov/LORANPLAN/efflegis/efflegis.html>.
50 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43 (1991); Carroll, supra note 4, at 811; Fine,
supra note 4, at 301 ("VAWA is an appropriate congressional response to a national
problem."); Maloney, supra note 4, at 1878 ("In particular, [the CRR] focuses on evi-
dence that gender-motivated violence is a serious problem demanding a national so-
lution."); Shargel, supra note 4, at 1883 ("Gender-motivated violence is a federal
problem that warrants a federal solution.").
51 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 913 (Motz, J., dissenting) (citing congressional find-
ings); H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 48 (1991); see also
Carroll supra note 4, at 811.
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first was a general allegation that the problem was out of control and
that because the states were charged with solving the problem, they
were failing.52 The second was a direct allegation of bias against wo-
men in the state systems.53
Nevertheless, the CRR provides for concurrent jurisdiction in
state courts, so women should be able to take their cases to the state
courts if the federal courts are too busy. This sacrifices the goal of
getting women out of an allegedly biased state court system, but at
least it would be something. Nevertheless, there has been no signifi-
cant CRR litigation in the state courts either.54 The Honorable Wil-
liam Bassler, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
New Jersey, catalogued the state remedies available to abused wo-
men 55 and determined that what women need most in an abusive situ-
52 See Bzonkala, 169 F.3d at 914 (Motz, J., dissenting) (citing Congressional find-
ings); see, e.g., supra note 12; Maloney, supra note 4, at 1886; Carolyn Weiss, Title IT of
the Vwlence Against Women Act: Constitutionally Safe and Sound, 75 WsH. U. L.Q. 723,
727-32 (1997).
53 See Birzonka/a, 169 F.3d at 914 (Motz, J., dissenting) (citing congressional find-
ings); see alsoJoseph R. Biden, Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN.
L. REv. 1285, 1301 (1994) ("The record of too many states in addressing violence
against women has been marked by prejudice rather than reason."); YvetteJ. Mabbun,
Title LTI of the iolence Against Women Act: The Answer to Domestic Violence or a Constitu-
tional Time-Bombi, 29 ST. MARY'S LJ. 207, 216 (1997); Rauschl, supra note 4, at 1636.
54 There have been just five published decisions on CRR issues to date. See supra
note 6 (listing cases).
55 Judge Bassler explained,
Research has established that a woman is at her greatest risk when separating
from her abuser. Statutes providing for protection orders have proven effec-
tive in providing safety and autonomy for abused women and children and
constraining and deterring abusing men. The majority of state codes impose
no time limit within which an abused person must file after an abusive inci-
dent. Except for Delaware and South Carolina, all jurisdictions permit an
abused person to obtain an ex parte temporary order of protection. Protec-
tion order codes authorize orders restraining the abuser from future acts of
domestic violence, granting exclusive possession of the victim's residence to
the victim, disallowing contact with the victim, awarding temporary custody
to the non-abusing parent, and granting spousal or child support. Forty-nine
states allow injunctions against further violence, while fifty permit exclusive
use of a residence or eviction of a perpetrator from the victim's household.
Forty-three jurisdictions authorize awards of custody or visitation, and
twenty-three authorize the payment of child or spousal support in protection
orders.
Half of state codes award attorneys fees and/or costs, although only
about one-quarter permit further monetary compensation, such as out-of-
pocket expenses, replacement of destroyed property, relocation expenses
and/or mortgage or rental payments. Statutes in more than forty jurisdic-
tions allow the court to order any additional appropriate relief.
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ation is immediate relief-in the form of injunctions and protective
orders against their spouses, in addition to social services like counsel-
ing and shelter.56 He found such remedies to be available in nearly
every state and although he concluded that they have not solved the
problem, he argued that state remedies were the best answer in this
area.
57
Despite the claims of the CRR's defenders that it is an appropri-
ate cause of action that cures the gaps in state law remedies, women
have not taken advantage of its provisions. One possible reason is the
difficulty of proving that an attack was "motivated by gender, s58 but
more likely it is because these women cannot get into court at all, or
that once they are there, an action for money damages is not what
they seek. In any case, the numbers again speak for themselves. If the
purpose of the CRR was to get violence against women into federal
court on a routine basis, it has certainly failed.
II. TBE FAILURE OF ACADEMICS TO CARE
The most disheartening aspect of the CRR is not its failure to
help women who are victims of violence. It is the willingness of the
legislature and the academia to pursue the discussion of the CRR
without asking whether the law does anything practical for the women
it is supposed to help.
A. Psychotherapeutic Legislation
A recurring theme in the academic commentary on the CRR is
that a "national solution" is necessary because violence against women
Violation of a civil protection order constitutes a misdemeanor in thirty-
five states. Contempt is an alternative charge that may be lodged against the
violator in many states, with civil contempt available in thirty-one jurisdic-
tions, and criminal contempt available in twenty-one. Although some states
provide for a minimum jail sentence of forty-eight hours to five days impris-
onment, most statutes give discretion to the court on sentencing. Generally,
these statutes set sentences to a maximum of six months or one year and a
maximum fine of $1,000.
Bassler, supra note 15, at 1162-64 (footnotes omitted); see also Klein & Orloff, supra
note 20.
56 See Bassler, supra note 15, at 1162-64.
57 See id. at 1167-68.
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1998). Showing that an act of violence against a
woman was motivated by her gender is at least a challenging factual proof. See Lisa
Barre-Quick & Shannon Matthew Kasley, The Road Less Traveled: Obstacles in the Path of
the Effective Use of the Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act in the Employ-
ment Context, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 415, 418 (1998). Nevertheless, problems of
proof have not been the story of the CRR cases. The story is that there are no cases.
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is a "national concern." 59 Frequently, support for the assertion that
violence against women is a "national concern" consists of statistics
indicating that many women across the country are suffering from vio-
lence. This is typically followed by the claim that state governments
are not getting the job done in this area.
The missing link is glaring. The CRR's supporters never explain
how the federal remedy will be superior to the state remedies. It is the
assumption on which their prolix analyses rests, and yet they seldom
set fingers to keyboards to defend it. When they say something about
what the CRR is supposed to do, the comments are revealing:
The signing of the Violence Against Women Act represented
the culmination of a four-year struggle of politics, law and under-
standing .... Here, I tell the story of [VAWA] with special reference
to its major attempt to change the legal terms in which we under-
stand this violence-the civil rights remedy.60
These civil rights laws reflect the growing recognition that
rather than being random and private matters, domestic violence,
rape and sexual assault are violent expressions of discrimina-
tion .... 61
For the first time, the right to be free from gender motivated
violence has been recognized formally as a civil right.62
[VAWA] sends a message to the nation ... that Congress con-
siders domestic violence a serious national epidemic. VAWA's provi-
sions tell victims that the nation takes their plight seriously .... 63
The VAWA represents an important opportunity for civil rights
activists and feminists to identify common goals and philosophies of
their respective social and legal reform movements, and an oppor-
tunity to convert their doctrines into practice through joint
action.6 4
59 See, e.g., Fine, supra note 4, at 301 ("VAWA is an appropriate congressional
response to a national problem."); Maloney, supra note 4, at 1878 ("In particular, it
focuses on evidence that gender-motivated violence is a serious problem demanding a
national solution .... ."); Shargel, supra note 4, at 1883 ("Gender-motivated violence is
a federal problem that warrants a federal solution."); see also SENATE COMM. ON THE
JuDiciARY, 101sr CONG., TURNING THE Acr iNro AcrION: THE VIOLENCE AGAINST Wo-
MEN LAW (Comm. Print 1994) (copy on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
60 Victoria F. Nourse, Where Vlolence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence
Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3-4 (1996).
61 Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Viwlence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for
Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 123, 123-24 (1999).
62 Maloney, supra note 4, at 1939.
63 Fine, supra note 4, at 301-02.
64 Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Con-
sciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 463, 466 (1996).
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These comments amount to unintentional self-parody. 65 The law
"sends a message," 66 "change[s] the legal terms,"67 "reflect[s] the
growing recognition,"68 "recognize[s] a civil right,"69 or "represents
an important opportunity... to identify common goals and philoso-
phies. '70 What it manifestly does not do is something to improve the
material condition of abused women.7 1 If it did, someone would say
so. But few of the CRR's defenders seem disturbed by the fact that it
has not.72 The gap between the theory and the reality is deeply
troubling.
One commentator put all of the CRR's accomplishments in one
basket, stating,
The passage of the Violence Against Women Act ... represents a
triumph of public education and awareness about what sexual as-
sault and domestic violence really mean. It stands for the proposi-
tion that a violent act by a man against a woman is not just a private
act, subject to traditional criminal and tort law remedies, but an act
that implicates our public perception of civic freedom. It declares
that women have a civil right to be free of violent attack and pro-
vides a remedy in federal court, thus acknowledging the historic fail-
ure of the states to adequately protect this right. Even in these
65 See also McTaggart, supra note 4, at 1151 ("Congress, for the first time since
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has recognized a federal civil right for wo-
men-a right to be free from violence.").
66 Fine, supra note 4, at 1939.
67 Nourse, supra note 60, at 3-4.
68 Goldscheid, supra note 61, at 124.
69 Maloney, supra note 4, at 1939.
70 See Rivera, supra note 64, at 466.
71 One of these authors comes close to recognizing that the CRR will have no
impact on the problem, but gives that fact no attention in her analysis of the law's
impact on "consciousness." See id. at 499-501.
72 But see Daniel Atkins et al., Striving forJustice with the Violence Against Women Act
and Civil Tort Actions, 14 Wisc. WOMEN'S L.J. 69, 69 n.13 (1999). ("In light of the vast
number of reports of domestic violence each year, VAWA cases are ridiculously infre-
quent.... [E]ither... the civil rights remedy of the VAWA is not well known among
advocates for victims of domestic violence, or... pursuing a VAWA lawsuit is not an
attractive legal option."); Margaret A. Cain, The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence
Against Women Act: Its Legacy and Future, 34 TULSA L.J. 367, 404-07 ("While VAWA
represents a giant step forward in raising consciousness concerning violence against
women, § 13981, which was so strenuously opposed, in practice will not have a signifi-
cant impact in eradicating crimes against women."); Stephanie Weiler, Bodily Integrity:
A Substantive Due Process Right to Be Free from Rape by Public Officials, 34 CAL. W. L. REV.
591, 607 (1998) ("The inadequacy of the VAWA is best seen by examining its track
record. There have been only three cases brought under the VAWA since its enact-
ment in 1994.").
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bleak times for public interest law, VAWA's enactment holds out
hope for the efficacy of law as an agent of social change.
73
That's it in a nutshell. The CRR represents triumphs, stands for
propositions, declares rights, acknowledges failure, and most of all,
holds out hope-but not by generating significant numbers of suc-
cessful lawsuits.74 Unaccountably omitted from the vast literature on
the CRR is a discussion of its practical impact on the condition of
abused women. Where are the judgments? Six years after "politics,
law and understanding" "culminated,"75 the fact remains: abused wo-
men are not better off because of this law.
The argument that the CRR will have great symbolic power in
advancing the cause of women's rights76 is also a red herring-in fact,
the law will have just the opposite effect. As it becomes clearer that
the law is impotent, the periodic flurries of attention paid to the law
will reveal it for what it is-a fad. The price will be paid in wasted time
and effort, and increased cynicism about the ability of the law to make
a difference.
The CRR's proponents jumped to conclusions. They decided the
states had failed to solve the problem and so the need for a federal
remedy was assumed. But there was not enough thought given to how
that federal remedy would succeed where the states had failed. The
argument for the CRR is of the classic form: "Something must be
done; this is something; therefore this must be done." The time spent
on the CRR has proven to be a very bad investment. The efforts of
police and prosecutors in the state systems fail to grab headlines, but
they also give an abused woman a chance to get what she needs-
timely, physical protection from her abuser.77
The CRR is a kind of psychotherapeutic legislation. It is psycho-
therapy, not for abused women, but for people studying the problem
of abused women. It makes legislators, lawyers, and law students feel
better, as though something important has been done about the prob-
lem. The notion of "federal civil rights legislation" evokes images of
the 1960s and dramatic action on behalf of disadvantaged minorities.
Of course, the CRR has not (and will not) cause any action to be taken
on behalf of abused women because, unlike the great civil rights legis-
73 Minna J. Kotkin, The Violence Against Women Act Project: Teaching a New Genera-
tion of Public Interest Lawyers, 4J.L. & PoL'Y 435, 435-36 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
74 While cases do exist, they are so rare that authors have been driven to describe
them in great detail (somewhat like the Ark of the Covenant) in articles concerning
the CRR. See Atkins et al., supra note 72, at 77-99.
75 See Norse, supra note 60, at 1-2.
76 See, e.g., Cain, supra note 72, at 404.
77 See Bassler, supra note 15, at 1161.
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lation of thirty-five years ago, it is not directed at viable defendants,
nor are there willing and able plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the idea that
the federal government has intervened is, in an academic sense, very
comforting.
B. Sound and Fuy-The Constitutionality of the CRR
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Brzonkala78 to clar-
ify the Court's recent Commerce Clause casuistry. The case may have
major constitutional significance, but it will mean very little to abused
women. The Brzonkala argument and opinion will provide another
opportunity for the CRR to distract the nation's attention from the
real problems battered women face. 79 The CRR's proponents will
make absurd claims on the steps of the courthouse about a glorious
victory or a tragic defeat while men continue to beat women.
Some have suggested that doubt about the CRR's constitutional-
ity is the reason there have been so few cases;80 but this is wishful
thinking. The practical barriers to bringing a CRR claim are far more
imposing than the constitutional ones.' Violence against women is
outside federal jurisdiction as a practical matter, and the Court will
not change that by deciding that it is within federal jurisdiction as a
constitutional matter.
78 Brzonkala v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
79 With over 40 articles so far, it would not be surprising if a Supreme Court case
generated 40 more.
80 See, e.g., Barre-Quick & Kasley, supra note 58, at 418.
The two most significant obstacles to the effective use of the civil rights pro-
vision of the Violence Against Women Act in the employment context are
the ongoing battle over the provision's constitutionality, and the challenges
attendant to effectively stating a cause of action under the Act by articulating
a gender-motivated, violent crime.
81 See, e.g., Wills, supra note 28, at 177; Duke Helfand, Eyes on Evidence: LAPD
Equips Patrol Cars with New Cameras to Document Domestic Abuse Victims' Injuries and Win
Cases in Court, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1996, at BI ("As many as eight of 10 battered wo-
men who contact police fail to pursue their cases by pressing charges or appearing in
court.").
No matter how heinous the assault, the great majority of domestic violence
victims have one characteristic in common: after making the initial report,
they have neither the will nor the courage to assist prosecutors in holding
the abusers criminally responsible .... Faced with having to testify in court,
domestic violence victims, especially battered women, routinely either re-
cant, minimize the abuse, or fail to appear.
Id.; see also Lisa R. Beck, Protecting Battered Women: A Proposal for Comprehensive Domestic
Violence Legislation in New York, 15 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 999, 1021 (1987) (referring to
this phenomenon as "complaint attrition").
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Ill. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: LOOKING ELsEWIERE82
Some commentators have realized what battered women need-
money and distance from their abusers.83 Unfortunately, the ability of
women to move away from their abusers is often hampered by their
poverty.8 4 Far worse, battered women are often unwilling to leave
their abusers-making intervention on their behalf extremely
difficult.8 5
Since large numbers of battered women are unwilling to press
charges,86 giving themselves at least a chance of sending the batterer
to jail, it is no wonder women are reluctant to sue civilly, with little or
no prospect of physical protection during the course of the suit. But
by far the most significant problem facing a battered woman is finan-
cial.8 7 If a battered woman had the money to pursue a lawsuit against
her spouse, she would be far better off spending that money on a
plane ticket, an apartment, and ajob search in a city where her abuser
has no contacts. 8 But of course, most battered women lack the re-
sources to pursue such a course.8 9
Programs that require the arrest and detention of abusers and
allow prosecutors to press charges without the victim's consent have a
far greater chance of ameliorating the problem than another cause of
action.90 Providing women with the means to put distance between
themselves and their abusers, through immediately available protec-
82 The author wishes expressly to disclaim any intention of offering a
comprehensive solution to this problem. This third section is included to point out
that some legislative responses to violence against women are reasonably related to
the problem and are worthy targets for further study, experimentation and
expenditures.
83 See Davis & Kraham, supra note 20, at 1144-55.
84 See generally Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham, Beaten, Then Robbed, N.Y.
Toms, Jan. 13, 1995, at A31.
85 See Wills, supra note 81, at 177 nn.23-24. The Anglo-American system of law
does not easily adjust to protect those who are unwilling to assert their claims.
86 See id. The fact that women are unable to escape their abusers on account of
their poverty is of course related to their unwillingness to sue or press charges.
87 See generally Davis & Kraham, supra note 20.
88 See id. at 1146-50.
89 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
90 SeeJoan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: Why It May Prove to Be the
Best First Step in Curbing Repeat Abuse, 10 CiSM. JusT. 2, 3 (1995); Bracher, supra note
34; Machaela Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Volence As a Crime Against the State: The Need
for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 643, 643 (1997); Marion Wanless,
Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Towards Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough,
1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 533, 573. But see Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated
rictim Participation in Domestic Volence Prosecutions, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1885
(1996).
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tive orders, restraining orders and evictions of the abusers, is ajob the
several states are taking on.91 In some cases, the legal weapons placed
at an abused woman's disposal by the state government are so power-
ful, even the generous provisions of the CRR pale in comparison. 92
91 See Bassler, supra note 15.
92 In the State of New York an order of protection is available to women as long
as domestic violence is simply alleged. See N.Y. CRIM PRO. LAw § 530.12(1) (a), (3)
(McKinney 1995). A woman proceeding in family court against her spouse is pro-
vided with counsel at no cost. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (29A) § 262 (McKinney 1998).
New York officials are further required to advise women of their rights in detail when
investigating an incident of domestic violence:
Every police officer, peace officer or district attorney investigating a family
offense under this article shall advise the victim of the availability of a shelter
or other services in the community, and shall immediately give the victim
written notice of the legal rights and remedies available to a victim of a fam-
ily offense under the relevant provisions of the criminal procedure law, the
family court act and the domestic relations law. Such notice shall be pre-
pared in Spanish and English and if necessary, shall be delivered orally, and
shall include but not be limited to the following statement:
If you are the victim of domestic violence, you may request that the
officer assist in providing for your safety and that of your children, in-
cluding providing information on how to obtain a temporary order of
protection. You may also request that the officer assist you in obtaining
your essential personal effects and locating and taking you, or assist in
making arrangements to take you, and your children to a safe place
within such officer's jurisdiction, including but not limited to a domes-
tic violence program, a family member's or a friend's residence, or a
similar place of safety. When the officer's jurisdiction is more than a
single county, you may ask the officer to take you or make arrangements
to take you and your children to a place of safety in the county where
the incident occurred. If you or your children are in need of medical
treatment, you have the right to request that the officer assist you in
obtaining such medical treatment. You may request a copy of any inci-
dent reports at no cost from the law enforcement agency. You have the
right to seek legal counsel of your own choosing and if you proceed in
family court and if it is determined that you cannot afford an attorney,
one must be appointed to represent you without cost to you.
You may ask the district attorney or a law enforcement officer to
file a criminal complaint. You also have the right to file a petition in the
family court when a family offense has been committed against you.
You have the right to have your petition and request for an order of
protection filed on the same day you appear in court, and such request
must be heard that same day or the next day court is in session. Either
court may issue an order of protection from conduct constituting a fam-
ily offense which could include, among other provisions, an order for
the respondent or defendant to stay away from you and your children.
The family court may also order the payment of temporary child sup-
port and award temporary custody of your children. If the family court
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But these remedies consume resources in the form of police, social
workers, prosecutors, and judges. The CRR, by contrast, is practically
free. If legislators want to protect women for violence, they are going
to have to realize that self-help remedies like the GRR, which place the
entire burden on the abused woman, are not the answer.93
IV. CONCLUSION
The civil rights remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act
resides in a category with the proverbial law against bad weather-the
selected means bears no relation to the intended end. It is disheart-
ening that so many legislators and legal commentators have failed to
recognize that abused women lack the means to pursue a civil rights
action against their spouse or partner and that the federal courts are
in no position to take on the problem. Lawmakers and academics
alike must recognize that social ills will not retreat in the face of highly
is not in session, you may seek immediate assistance from the criminal
court in obtaining an order of protection.
The forms you need to obtain an order of protection are available
from the family court and the local criminal court (the addresses and
telephone numbers shall be listed). The resources available in this com-
munity for information relating to domestic violence, treatment of inju-
ries, and places of safety and shelters can be accessed by calling the
following 800 numbers (the statewide English and Spanish language
800 numbers shall be listed and space shall be provided for local domes-
tic violence hotline telephone numbers).
Filing a criminal complaint or a family court petition containing
allegations that are knowingly false is a crime.
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 530.11 (McKinney 1995). Sharp criticism has been leveled at
statutes which protect the victim in a domestic violence case to such an extent that
they jeopardize due process for the man. See Christopher Frank, Comment, Criminal
Protection Orders in Domestic Violence Cases: Getting Rid of Rats with Snakes, 50 U. MiAiM L.
REv. 919 (1996). For a comprehensive treatment of the NewYork statutes, see Ronald
J. Bavero, Representing Clients in Family Offense Proceeding, 16 PAcE L. REv. 49 (1995).
For a multijurisdictional review, see Frank, supra; Klein & Orloff, supra note 20.
93 In Doe v. Doe 929 F. Supp. 608, 616 (D. Conn. 1996), the court described how
the CRR is supposed to pay for itself. "A plaintiff who obtains relief in a civil rights
lawsuit does so not for himself [or herself] alone but also as a private attorney general
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest importance." Compare
this to Congressman Wilson's rebuke of a civil damages amendment for the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. "This is called protection. This is what we are asked to do in the
way of enforcing the bill of rights. Dollars are weighed against the right of life, liberty,
and property. Sir, I cannot see the justice of that doctrine . . . it is the duty of the
Government of the United States to provide proper protection, and to pay the costs
attendant on it." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1295 (1866) (recording the state-
ment of Congressman Wilson).
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publicized, symbolic action. 94 Real money will have to be committed
if the problem is to be solved-but solutions like that won't be nearly
as popular as the relatively cost-free CRR. No doubt legislators and
academics were eager to support the CRR because it has such a small
downside. It is very, very cheap-the fictitious plaintiffs get the law-
suits started and the imaginary defendants pay all the judgments and
legal bills. In the civil rights remedy, America got exactly what it paid
for.
94 See, e.g., The Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (A) (1990).
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